Comments for Civil Affairs at PKSOI Blog

Comment on The Future of Civil Affairs by S. Battle

S. Battle — Thu, 20 Oct 2011 00:16:42 +0000

Having read this deliberation, I cannot agree more with K. Sisk. As an AC CA officer that has served as a CAT-A TL in a JSOTF, a CMSE in 2 Embassies, and an S9 on a BCT staff I can confirm that AC CA under USASOC is the correct choice. A regionally aligned, language proficient force capable of Civil Reconnaissance, CIM and stability operations ISO COIN and unconventional warfare is aptly placed under the SOF footprint. COIN is the current flavor with GPF in the long war. However, will this be the case in the future? In my experience, regional specific knowledge, language proficiency, negotiation skills and CR are the skill sets that make AC CA exponentially valuable to any SOF element. When working as a combined team in areas outside the current conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan, MISO, CA and SF create effects upon environments that GPF cannot unless they deploy with a sizeable force, and with a far larger budget – I have witnessed this first hand. This is not feasible, nor is it cost effective. Creating separate commands and GPF vs. SOF AC CA is going to create division in the force and as Sisk says, will degrade the abilities of AC CA that make us so useful in the first place. The reserves are organized and have the force structure to support GPF. As I understand the agreement in the “great divorce of 2006,” the 95th was to support USASOC mission sets and USACAPOC was to support GPF during their deployment cycle. However, it became apparent that USACAPOC could not, under their current organization and system, execute their contractual obligations. I saw no mistrust of RC CA from the active BCT’s during our OEF deployment as a BCT S9 – In fact the opposite is generally true. It is true, at least from what I saw during my deployment to OEF, that RC CA support to BCTs is drawn from a pool. However, even this can and is mitigated by offset deployment cycles, where a new BCT, falls in on a RC CA BN that has several months on the ground. The BCT then has experienced CA teams to draw real institutional knowledge from and the frustrations inherent in RIP/TOA are mitigated. It seems now that instead of fixing the broken reserve system, the answer is to expand AC CA and have them support GPF. It honestly makes me wonder what the RC CA component is going to do once the 85th CA BDE is stood up. Furthermore, it makes me wonder what the 85th is going to do once Iraq and Afghanistan draw down to manageable deployment cycles and GPF focus their attention on conventional battles instead of COIN.

Comment on MAINSTREAMING STABILITY OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE ARMY by CSM Fulmer

CSM Fulmer — Tue, 21 Sep 2010 05:50:00 +0000

Very good discussion and the Article is on point with the way ahead for USACAPOC. I’m glad to see we have such bright troopers openly discussing the issues we face.

Having just returned from Iraq where I worked “with” the Baghdad PRT and Division to secure a very successful tour I still couldn’t shake the feeling that our greatest road-block is educating our own “Big Army” on its Reserve CA’s capabilities and best use. To often our CA Companies were chasing contract paperwork or collecting CIM in a vacuum while our talented BCT “land owners” did what they thought was the best CA work to keep their OER’s competitive. Too many times did I also have to watch a SGT with a PhD in Agriculture be resigned to driving or manning a security position because a very talented young Infantry officer with no Ag experience ran a local meeting because he couldn’t come to grips with a “SGT” running a local farm coop meeting. “Big Army doesn’t work that way”; much to the detriment of USACAPOC and our USAR CA “generalists”

The sooner CA is re-aligned back under USASOC and free to “augment” individual BCT commanders at all Phases of warfare the healthier USACAPOC will be in securing it’s future.

v/r

CSM

Comment on MAINSTREAMING STABILITY OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE ARMY by Eric Chen

Eric Chen — Fri, 09 Apr 2010 16:17:24 +0000

Thanks for the feedback. Certainly, Columbia is strong in all the academic areas you named. I wonder if the QDR can be used to boost the argument for ROTC at Columbia?

Comment on MAINSTREAMING STABILITY OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE ARMY by civilaffairspksoi

civilaffairspksoi — Mon, 29 Mar 2010 15:06:37 +0000

Eric,
I know the Army currently targets some of its ROTC scholarships specifically at schools offering degrees in nursing. It also targets some scholarships to help provide officers to Army National Guard and Army Reserve units, as well as the Active Duty force. Since over 90% of Civil Affairs is in the USAR, if United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) designated USAR Civil Affairs as an accession branch that could bring officers in as lieutenant, this might be an option. I am thinking degrees in anthropology, civil engineering, requirements for some category three languages would be useful. I think we are still at the advocacy stage, however. Keep advocating. I think this is an important cause.
V/r
Bryan

Comment on MAINSTREAMING STABILITY OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE ARMY by Eric Chen

Eric Chen — Mon, 29 Mar 2010 03:00:59 +0000

“I mentioned earlier, advanced civilian schooling and ROTC scholarships should be tied to degree programs that have direct applicability to stability operations and to achieving foreign language proficiency.”

I’m an advocate for returning ROTC to Columbia. Do you think we can tie these efforts together? That there is no program at Columbia right now presents an opportunity to create a new ROTC program with fresh imagination in a flagship institution.

Comment on The Future of Civil Affairs by K. Sisk

K. Sisk — Sat, 30 Jan 2010 01:33:54 +0000

Most agree that all Civil Affairs should be brought back in line with USASOC. I think there was one dissenter on this one and honestly, a newly created Army Competency is just not a good enough reason to do this. Civil Affairs has had a long-standing relationship with Special Operations dating back to the 1960’s and the branch languished under conventional control until it was officially made part of Special Operations in the 1980’s. It was not until this time that the career field saw any real usage and was still ignored by the Army as a whole. Now it could be argued that the Army has changed and that those days are long gone, but then were would these Stability and Support Operations take place in the long-term? Iraq and Afghanistan sure, but can anyone think of anywhere else?
The Philippines was ready to reject a mere 200 and AFRICOM, consisting of approximately 1500 personnel cannot find a home in Africa because of fears it militarizes the effort. So outside of an invasion what country is going to allow a BCT, consisting of 3500 or so to conduct Stability and Support? Not saying it can’t happen but the odds are not in favor of this. The safe bet would be with SOF forces conducting Phase 0 operations. The skill sets from both Active and Reserve would find much more utility under USASOC in the long term, have better funding and once again, the branch would be whole.
I think we all agree the BCTs both require and deserve proper habitual Civil Affairs support, the rub comes from just how to do that. Many have argued that the Active CA should pick up the ball on this, but that is just a band-aid. This solution will cause undue damage to the active side of the house and will not address the larger issues within the career field. For Active CA it is a matter of not only numbers, but also of skills and training. Splitting the Active force along SOF and GPF lines would have personnel floating back and forth between the two commands causing further erosion of regional and language skills. These problems are already present due to the repeated rotations into Iraq and Afghanistan. Without going into major detail, Active CA would essentially lose the skills that make them useful. A dual track could be created but then we are talking about creating entirely new training pipelines, and career paths. This then creates an “us and them” atmosphere within the same component. The solution needs to come from a combined effort between the Reserve and Active Civil Affairs forces.
Civil Affairs has been structured as a two phased implementation since the early 1970’s so unless we want to dismantle the system and create a new one we need to work off that template. Only the Reserves have anything close to the force structure required to support the BCTs properly in a habitual fashion. Currently 112 vice 71 BCTs, with another additional 20 companies to be formed giving 132 Reserve CA companies. Create another 10 and you now have a 2:1 ratio to allow for needed dwell time. Align these companies to the BCTs and integrate AGR into the S9 positions. This will allow for horizontal planning from individuals from the actual supporting units. It never made sense to have the Active personnel there and with the Majors shortfall that’s about to hit the Active side these freed up personnel will have more than enough places to go.
Even without the new brigade, Active CA is expecting shortfalls within this grade until 2014, with BCT positions 2016. Factor in the new brigade and it moves right to 2017. Not talking small numbers here either at least 50 personnel or more depending on the year. Granted the Reserves are also obligated to other missions outside of BCT support, so an in-depth study needs to take place to identify missions that can be taken over by another entity. For example, do we really still need 1500 or so in Kosovo?
With the Reserves aligned, the Active Force once again becomes the bridging force for the Reserves. Working with any BCT as required until security is established regardless of how long that takes. This bridging force can also be used to fill the gap for MREs. If there are two Active CA brigades both under USASOC this creates a larger pool to draw from increasing the odds of the support actually having the correct language skills and regional experience for the BCT’s mission. Once we reduce or withdrawal from the current conflicts both the Reserves and Active CA can then be utilized by USASOC as before barring a request for forces from elsewhere. I don’t know it just seems to me if we just tweak the system that proved successful in the past, under an advocate that has proven to be more benefical than not, we might just be able to ensure better opportunities for both components in the future. After all, it’s not as if we’re doing anything new.

Comment on Responsibility to Protect by Enevewharne

Enevewharne — Wed, 25 Nov 2009 22:40:24 +0000

Through you championing details. It helped me in my assignment

Comment on About by civilaffairspksoi

civilaffairspksoi — Mon, 19 Oct 2009 16:33:42 +0000

Joe,
Go ahead and send me stuff you would like posted and links to any recent articles/slideshows about MCAST and I will put it on the site.
V/r
Bryan

Comment on About by Joe Navratil

Joe Navratil — Mon, 19 Oct 2009 14:24:42 +0000

Hi, I am the Strategic Comm advisor for Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command in Little Creek, VA. We would like to see if you would like more info about Navy Civil Affairs and what we do.

Also, we are attending the Civil Affairs conference in Arlington VA on 30-31 Oct and could have one of our folks be a guest blogger if you are not attending yourself.

Thanks,
Joe Navratil
757-318-4450 x 339

Comment on Civil Affairs Support to Irregular Warfare by civilaffairspksoi

civilaffairspksoi — Thu, 15 Oct 2009 17:38:14 +0000

Steve,
All good points. I believe that trained MSC and ANC officers with two weeks of CA training are a site better than nothing, especially if they are willing to deploy and may have deployed to OEF or OIF previously in their original skill. I think it is good that the RC CA course had lengthened to nine weeks. You are right, the Army should fully staff USACAPOC given the optempo of CA and PSYOP forces.
V/r
Bryan